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Imagine that you are travelling in a
poor country in sub-Saharan Africa, or
Southeast Asia, or Latin America. Imag-
ine further that you become seriously
ill. Imagine further still that you are very
lucky —you find a well-trained physi-
cian who first can diagnose your illness
and then knows how to treat it.
If he gives you a prescription, chances
are that unless you yourself were a phy-
sician or a pharmacist you would not
understand It. But you recognize the
name or the logo of the manufacturer,
and if you can tie the name or the sym-
bol to a well-known, respected pharma-
ceutical manufacturer, almost certainly
you will feel relieved. You will expect
that the worst will soon be over and you
will be on your way to recovery.
Would you fear that such a drug firm
might have high ethical standards to
govern its action at home but would
conceal dangerous or lethal side effects
of its products in a poor country? You
probably would not be troubled by such
worries. Your gut feeling would tell you
to trust the decency and the moral com-
mon sense of a widely respected, hon-
orable company.
Would you fear that such a drug
firm would communicate openly and
honestly with governmental drug au-
thorities, the health profession, and
patients in their own country —for ex-
ample the United States, Germany, or
Switzerland — but would allow serious
inconsistencies or omissions to mark its
communication in a developing coun-
try? You probably would not be trou-
bled by such concerns. As a matter of
fact, with widespread poverty, illiter-
acy, sickness, and hunger and with
the pronounced scarcity of physicians,
nursing persons, and pharmacists all in-
fluencing drug safety in many parts of
the Third World, you would probably
assume that a respected, honorable
company would try even harder to
maintain the safest possible use of its
products.
Certainly, any other approach would
be sheer lunacy. There is not one rea-
son why an internationally honored
corporation should put sick people at
risk and jeopardize its own reputation.
Worse, it would be Indecent.
Yet, there is reason for worry. Silver-
man, Lydecker, and Lee reveal once
again1 that there still are companies
that knowingly put corporate greed be-
fore human welfare, companies that ob-
viously assign a lower value to lives in
Africa, Asia, or Latin America than to
lives in the USA, western Europe, and
Japan. Their latest book gives not only
a comprehensive review of historical er-
rors In judgments and failures in the
learning process that have occurred
over the past 25 years, it also documents
recent marketing decisions that are of
questionable value or seem to be totally
Indefensible.
The report of these Investigators, all
of the University of California at San
Francisco (UCSF), cannot be lightly dis-
missed. Since 1976, when they began
the systematic examination of this Inter-
national problem and first exposed it to
public attention, they have maintained
their credibility among both the attack-
ers and the defenders of the phar-
maceutical industry,2 and information
policies, promotional methods, and


























































































































maceutical corporations in Third World
countries, and particularly the alleged
or actual use of double standards — one
set of rules for the rich nations, another
set for the poor— have been the focus
of critical attention.3 It has long been
evident that establishing appropriate
health policies in a country with wide-
spread poverty and. sickness is difficult
enough.4 Where these difficulties have
been compounded by additional prob-
lems created by careless, socially irre-
sponsible pharmaceutical marketing,
life for everyone —the patients, the
health professions, the governments,
and the entire pharmaceutical indus-
try—becomes even more difficult.
It is only natural that there have been
and still are differences of opinion on
what the role of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry in a developing country should
be. There can be no justification, how-
ever, for double standards on issues
that may affect the health and especially
the lives of patients. Any such differ-
ences are not merely unjustifiable, they
are unethical, and they represent ex-
ceedingly bad business practices.
Although there is no need for a spe-
cial "code of pharmaceutical ethics/'
there are important basic differences be-
tween the pharmaceutical industry and
almost all other industrial groups. The
ethical challenge for the pharmaceuti-
cal industry is inescapable: drugs are
not commodities like other consumer
products. They are used because the
people who need them, are sick or in
pain, because they have disabling phys-
ical or mental disorders, or because they
may be facing death. In the case of
pharmaceutical products, "consumer
sovereignty" —the freedom to choose or
refuse a product —is limited.
In the pharmaceutical industry, drug
safety and risk/benefit assessments made
by company specialists or managers
have a crucial impact. If these special-
ists or managers make mistakes, they
err not just for themselves and their
company but also for the sick people
who are at their mercy. Even when the
company seeks to defend its actions be-
cause the industry is governed by com-
prehensive laws and regulations, it must
be ever conscious of the special respon-
sibility it holds because of its intimate
involvement in public health.
In some cases, Silverman and his col-
leagues have disclosed, pharmaceuti-
cal companies have sought to explain
differences in standards by attributing
them, to what may be termed "local con-
ditions"—the decision of a governmen-
tal agency in a Third. World nation, to
permit inclusion, of a particular claim or
indication that is banned elsewhere or
not to require disclosure of a particular
hazard, In. such, cases, the companies
have asserted that they were acting
legally. Such an escape maneuver is
unacceptable. Enlightened judgment
would suggest that such an explana-
tion as "But we're not breaking any
laws" is insufficient under conditions
in which there is no state-of-the-art
regulation concerning drug safety. It
is certainly insufficient in countries that
are, as Gunnar Myrdal called them,
"soft states," where laws exist but are
not enforced.5 These and other circum-
stances demand that corporations take
a deeper look at their responsibilities
and moral obligations. Even when the
law appears to be adequate and its en-
forcement effective, there is room for
ethical reflection. Knowledge within a
pharmaceutical corporation often runs
far ahead of regulatory procedures.
Thus, acting legally is at best the ethi-
cal minimum and. should not be taken
as acting morally.
Perceived responsibility that stems
from better information or better insight
must lead to adequate and appropriate
action, even though, local law does not
require it. Particularly in the area of
drug safety, standards that embody
state-of-the-art knowledge must be ap-


























































































































they apply and regardless of whether
or not they are required elsewhere.
The Silverman group has found that
there has now been a striking improve-
ment in the quality of the promotion of
their products by multinational pharma-
ceutical companies. In comparison with
20 years ago, most of them —though
certainly not all —have tempered their
claims in developing countries to con-
form to scientific evidence, and they are
more willing to disclose hazards. They
are more likely to tell the same story in
the Third World that they tell in indus-
trialized countries. For a good number
of internationally active pharmaceutical
corporations, the effort to improve drug
safety has become a joint responsibil-
ity. It involves consumers, public inter-
est groups, and the media. In addition,
this joint effort involves the traditional
medicopharmaceutical groups in gov-
ernment, in teaching and research in-
stitutions, and within industry.6
A new problem increasingly endan-
gering patients in Third World countries
is posed by local companies manufac-
turing and marketing products that are
spurious or counterfeit. This problem
has been taken up for the first time in
Bad Medicine (chapter 8) with adequate
prominence.
The UCSF group represents a remark-
able combination of skills: Silverman is
a trained pharmacologist and also an
internationally respected reporter, Ly-
decker (Mrs. Silverman) is fluent in
many languages and has had many
years of experience in editing material
dealing with pharmaceuticals, and Lee
is an experienced clinician, a onetime
Assistant Secretary for Health in Wash-
ington, a former chancellor of UCSF,
and now head of the university's Insti-
tute for Health Policy Studies. Through
their wide network of fellow pharma-
cologists, fellow journalists, and fellow
clinicians not only in the USA and Eu-
rope but also in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, they were able to obtain infor-
mation never before released. In addi-
tion, they somehow managed to induce
highly critical consumer advocates and
overly defensive industry leaders —
many on both sides had sworn they
would never meet with the opposi-
tion—to sit down together and hold
productive discussions. Their book pre-
sents, for the first time, a comprehen-
sive, well-documented, and constantly
fascinating account of their efforts.
The California team has contributed
much to the successful outcome of dis-
cussions among industry, medical and
social scientists, physicians, pharma-
cists, government leaders, representa-
tives of the media, consumer activists,
and public interest groups. Over the last
10 years, these discussions are success-
fully replacing "confrontations" with
"conversations."
The discussions have likewise helped
in finding shared understanding. The
process of wrestling with problems that
have no simple solutions, and the will-
ingness to be challenged by people who
have had different experiences and who
base their judgments on different val-
ues, has dramatically heightened the
quality of many kinds of results and not
merely the quality of pharmaceutical
marketing policies.
Although such discussions did not
and, of course, never will lead automat-
ically to comprehensive agreement on
all matters in dispute, they are in any
case broadening understanding as based
on all available information. Even more
significant, more and more of those in-
volved are finding themselves able to
dispense with claims to superiority, to
reconsider their own positions, and if
necessary to accept once unpalatable
views. Such discussions illustrate the
continuing value of the old Socratic dis-
tinction between "certainty/' a subjective
conviction that is no longer susceptible
to doubt, and "truth," which is objec-
tively identical with the real facts. We


























































































































may be, none of us possesses the defi-
nite and complete truth.
It was sometim.es painful In the
past —and may be so in the future— to
admit that it remains important to con-
tinue to search for new and more ap-
propriate solutions, even when we are
convinced that we have all the answers.
Too often, individual or collective as-
sumptions act as fences that keep some
things Inside and other things outside
our awareness. Openness and plural-
ism are required. What Is not needed
Is arbitrariness or cheap "tolerance" ap-
plied only to avoid arguments. True
dialogue differs from, manipulative per-
suasion by dealing critically with both
the necessity of acting in an economi-
cally reasonable manner and the im-
perative requirement to consider wider
public Interests.
Are all the problems settled? They
are not. On the one hand, the problem,
of drug safety has become an Issue
which increasingly involves domestic
firms presenting claims that cannot be
justified by scientific evidence and be-
ing reluctant to disclose hazards. On the
other hand, there remains the hard,
truth "that corporate misconduct, like
the lowly cockroach, is a plague that we
can suppress but never exterminate/'7
This situation makes the continuous
work of concerned and able people —
people like Silverman, Lydecker, and.
Lee — necessary and valuable.
— Klaus M. Leisinger
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